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Résumé.  
Dans cet article, nous nous intéressons au devenir professionnel des jeunes diplômés de doctorat, 
ayant obtenu leur diplôme dans des disciplines relevant des sciences exactes en 1996. La création 
des programmes post-doctoraux visait à son origine les jeunes docteurs souhaitant poursuivre une 
carrière académique. Cependant, une part non négligeable de jeunes passés par un post-doctorat 
sont recrutés dans le secteur privé, et en particulier sur des positions professionnelles hors du 
domaine de la recherche. La question qui se pose dès lors est celle de la valeur sur le marché du 
travail de cette expérience post-doctorale. Nous proposons ici d’estimer une fonction de gains pour 
les jeunes docteurs en emploi dans le secteur privé en contrôlant de leur participation à un post-
doctorat. Afin de contrôler le biais de sélection qui survient dans le cas où des dimensions 
individuelles inobservées sont corrélées entre la participation au post-doctorat et le niveau de salaire 
perçu, nous estimons un modèle à effet de traitement. Le principal résultat est que lorsque le biais 
de sélection n’est pas contrôlé, la participation à un post-doctorat a un effet positif sur les gains, 
cependant, lorsque l’effet de sélection est contrôlé, ce rendement positif disparaît. Ce résultat nous 
conduit à supposer que le stage post-doctoral joue davantage le rôle d’un signal dans le début de 
carrière des docteurs. Ce résultat est par ailleurs renforcé lorsque nous contrôlons en plus du 
possible effet de sélection produit par le fait que notre échantillon de travail ne prend en compte 
que les docteurs en emploi dans le secteur privé.  
 
Abstract.  
In this paper, we address the question of destination of post-doctorates for young French PhD 
graduated in exact sciences in 1996. The creation of post-doctoral program was firstly designated to 
PhD willing to embark on a public career. However, an important part of post-doctorates rather get 
to the private sector, particularly outside research positions. The question that occurs is that of the 
value of post-doctoral experience. We propose here to estimate earnings of young doctorates in 
private jobs had they participated to a post-doctoral program. To control for selection bias arising 
in the case where unobservable elements are correlated between participation and earnings, we 
estimate a treatment effect model. The main finding is that when selection bias is not control for, 
post-doctoral participation increases earnings, however, when controlling for selection bias, there is 
no more a positive effect of the participation. As regards to this finding we point out that post-
doctoral program play much more the role of a signal in the first-stage career. This finding is also 
strengthened when using a bivariate selection rule. In that case, we also control for the endogenous 
nature of having been recruited in the private sector.  
 
JEL classification: J31, C35 
Key-words: PhD career, treatment effect model, bivariate selection rule. 
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Introduction 
 
The French academic system yields around 10 000 PhD per year in all fields of education, so that 
France is among the countries which have a huge number of young PhD. Comparatively, Europe 
has 68 000 new PhD each year and USA more than 40 000 (Nsf, 2002). The number of PhD in 
science and engineering has doubled over the last twenty years or so in countries like Japan, France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom, under the stimulus of higher education and research policies 
based on the premise that the production of high-level scientific diplomas was a key to future 
economic growth. The stakes are high, especially in the medical, engineering and biological 
sciences. Yet the number of doctoral students fields is tending to decline or to remain at the same 
level. In the French higher education system, 6 000 PhD are graduated in exact sciences each year, 
whereas the number of thesis in human and social sciences is growing slowly (40% on all PhDs in 
1998). 
 
At the same time, we observe a decrease in the number of job offered in the public sector for 
research since the beginning of the 90s. The public research system in France is rather specific, 
offering, at least theoretically, rapid access to tenured positions in universities or in public 
institutions (CNRS, INSERM, INRA…) and being rather different from other research systems 
such as the US, German or British systems. In the United States, university teachers may be 
recruited on a permanent or non-permanent basis, assistant professors may acquire tenure after 
many years or be hired on a temporary basis. Access to tenured positions is not immediate in 
Germany either, and a substantial proportion of recent doctorate recipients take up jobs in private 
sector research (Verdier et al., 2001), especially as the links between science and industry are 
traditionally strong. 
Coming back to the French case, a point which is crucial is that recruitments on tenured positions 
are yearly organised and recent doctorates may apply several times before obtaining a job in the 
public sector for research. The new orientations of public policy are tending to reduce the number 
of tenured job offers and to increase the number of jobs on temporary contracts, that is fixed-term 
contracts or post-doctoral programmes. At present, we can notice that there is an overproduction 
of PhDs compared to the number of jobs offered in the public research system. This key figure is 
not limited to the French case and the same pattern can be found in the US (Lowell, 2001).  
 
Also, since the mid-nineties, the papers dealing with the analysis of job opportunities for young 
PhD show an increasing proportion of them employed in the private sector (for France, see Béret et 
al., 2003). Young scientists, mainly those with degrees in mechanics, engineering sciences or 
computer science are more and more attracted to the private sector and less and less to academic 
careers. This partially results from the existence of a queue entry-level academic positions and at the 
same time from a major transformation of doctoral training occurring during the last decade which 
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is tending to improve and develop links between science and industry (Beltramo et al., 2001; 
Mangematin, 2000). 
 
Confronted to a stressed labour market, policy makers created waiting time positions, namely post-
doctoral programmes. The labour market for young PhD is also very specific and characterised by a 
huge number of post-doctoral positions, fixed-term contracts financed by research contracts and 
mainly obtained immediately after graduation. In that way, post-doctoral positions are supposed to 
be selective waiting time positions at the entry of academic sector and to improve the probability to 
obtain an academic job for those who did not obtain it immediately after graduation. 
 
As far as we know, this field of study was discussed little, undoubtedly because of scarcity of data 
on that topic (Recotillet, 2003). Furthermore, assessment are mainly related to the estimation of the 
probability to obtain an academic job (see for the French labour market, Cahuzac and Robin, 2003; 
Hanchane and Recotillet, 2003). Cahuzac and Robin (2003) distinguish between post-doctoral 
positions and fixed-term contracts and show that for PhD graduates in life sciences the 
participation to a post-doctoral program induces a shrinkage of the instantaneous rate of transition 
to an academic job or to an industrial research job. Using longitudinal data on early careers of PhD 
graduated in all fields of education, Hanchane and Recotillet (2003) rather illustrate a positive effect, 
but weak, of post-doctoral positions on the probability to be recruited as researcher in the public 
system.  
 
The objective of the present paper is to enlarge the assessment of the post-doc effect to the career 
of those who did not attend the public sector for research, using French longitudinal data on PhDs’ 
early careers. Given the lack of academic jobs, a part of post-doctorates turn to private sector and 
choose a career of industrial researcher, expert or consultant.  
This lead to consider a model of circulation on the labour market for doctorates that we propose to 
test, at least partially, using individual data on labour market mobility. Beside the traditionally 
segment composed of research and development in the public and private sector in which 
differentiations occur between occupations (between assistant professors and full time researchers) 
and firms (between multinational firms and others), a new segment is appearing, leading doctorates 
to jobs outside research and development in the public or private sector. 
 
Our basic assumption is that this way of structuring labour market for recent doctorates produces a 
double differentiation of doctorates which itself will lead to a segmentation in the job opportunities. 
The construction of a European knowledge society also paves the way for reading in doctorates 
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diplomas the core of new elites1 (D1), and, depending on their place in the depicted labour market 
(briefly in or out R&D2) will belong or not to the definition of scientific elites. In short, expansion 
of doctorates diplomas in higher education systems would lead to internal differentiations between 
doctorates themselves. Production of elites would concern only a part of this model of labour 
market circulation. The status of post-doctoral positions is also questioned, as they are fairly 
intended to support entry in higher education or research. As such, they could be considered as a 
way to distinguish between our two types of doctorates. From an econometric point of view, we 
also anticipate that a selection effect is strongly expected and, as a matter of fact, must be treated 
and controlled. 
 
In the case that we are dealing with, the question that unsurprisingly arises is the value of a post-
doctoral experience for PhD who are finally employed in the private sector. Stating that post-
doctoral programs are devoted to public research carriers, we face nevertheless to a not 
unimportant part of post-doctorates which are employed in the private sector afterwards. The 
question that we propose to answer is that of facing a positive wage premium or not on jobs in the 
private sector from a post-doctoral experience. The change observed in the career of those who 
attended a post-doctoral program and then got a job in the private sector could be interpreted as an 
anti-screening device or/and as a period of human capital accumulation – specific or general 
following the definition given by Becker (1964).  
Whereas the identification of screening and human capital remains a well known difficulty in labour 
economics, the treatment effect model framework might be a well suited modelling to go further in 
that way. From the econometrical point of view, the empirical assessment proposed here consists 
of identification of post-doctorate’s effect which allows us to isolate the endogenous bias. Generally 
speaking, the endogenous bias comes from the existence of unobservable individual characteristics 
which are correlated both in the earnings observed in private sector and the probability to go 
through a post-doctorate, given that participation to a post-doc is assumed to be selective. As we 
are able to observe the wages earned by doctorates had they participated to a post-doctorate or not, 
we depart from standard Heckman two-step estimator and opt for a treatment effect model 
(Barnow et al., (1981); Woolridge, 2002). 
Following the estimation of a treatment effect model, we go further in estimating a bivariate 
selection rule, trying to control for selection bias from post-doctoral participation and private 
orientation. Actually, according to the model of doctorates circulation we have in mind, we suspect 
that turning to the private sector after the thesis is negatively correlated to post-doctoral 
participation, as post-doctoral positions might be more suited to embarkment in a public career.  
                                                 
1 Exception should be made for France, where Grandes Ecoles is still considered as the main way of 
producing elites. 
2 More detailed segmentation undoubtedly take place according to reputation effects of labs, universities 
etc.  
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Data are presented in section 2, a treatment effect model is addressed in section 3,  whereas section 
4 consists of the estimation of a wage equation with bivariate probit selection rule in order to 
control for public/private choice on the job market. The final section concludes. 
 
 
2. Data 
 
The outcome of participation to a post-doctoral program on earnings in private jobs is examined by 
estimating the previous treatment model for young PhD awarded during the year 1996 and 
surveyed in 1999 in France3. The sample -1744 young people- is nationally representative of French 
PhD awarded in 1996 in exact sciences, human and social sciences. Among the 1744 young PhD, 
844 obtained a job in the private sector, nearly 50% of the sample, whom 685 graduated in exact 
sciences. The main advantage of this database is to provide information on participation to post-
doctoral program, which is in itself a very scarce information. More than a quarter of young PhD 
had attended a post-doctoral program (about an half for natural and life sciences PhD, see table 1) 
and 20% of them had a job in the private sector afterwards. As post-doctoral positions seems to be 
radically different whether field of graduation (exact sciences or human and social sciences), our 
empirical test is restricted to PhD in exact sciences. Furthermore, the latter are more often recruited 
in the private sector than graduated in human and social sciences who, for the most part, still enter 
the public sector.  
 
Table 1 – Proportion of post-doctorate, by fields of education 
N=1744 % 
fields 
% post-doctorate at 
least one time on 3 
years 
% post-doctorate at least one time on 3 
years, except those still in post-doctoral 
position at the time of the survey 
Mathematics, physics 16% 18% 20% 
Mechanic, engineering 
sciences, computing 
19% 11% 13% 
Chemical 13% 18% 22% 
Natural sciences 25% 45% 34% 
Law, economics, 
management 
13% 4% 6% 
Human sciences 14% 4% 5% 
Total 100% 27% 19% 
 
                                                 
3 This longitudinal survey has been carried out by the Centre for Research on Qualifications (French 
Ministry of Education).  
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The database is longitudinal so that we have at our disposal the monthly position on the labour 
market of PhD graduates during three years after graduation. In addition, a detailed description of 
the first and last job is collected in the survey (wage, status, size of the company, occupation…). 
Information on participation to post-doctoral position consists of a question asked to graduates 
(yes/no) but no more precise details are available. We are also forced to treat post-doc positions as 
homogeneous even if we suspect heterogeneity in their forms (post-doc abroad or not, granting 
support, reputation of the lab…). Most of the PhDs who participated to a post-doc did it at the 
very beginning of the career (Table 1). Nevertheless, nearly 7% of the entire sample is still in post-
doc at time of the survey, so that the assessment conducted here is restricted to those who come to 
an end of the post-doc. 
Another part of the information collected concerns doctoral training in itself and is supposed to 
strongly influenced the early careers of PhD: time to degree, type of financial support (private, 
public…), training in a company, PhD completed after graduation in a Grandes Ecoles (engineers 
diplomas). Some papers in the literature on French doctorates have shown that doctorates already 
graduated from Grandes Ecoles have very similar professional destinations as engineers without 
doctorate diploma (Beltramo et al., 2001). 
 
 
3. A treatment effect model to assess post-doctoral participation 
 
The econometrical measure of participation to a program has been widely studied in a literature 
confronted by selection effect (Maddala, 1985; Heckman and Robb, 1985; Woolridge, 2002). The 
main difficulty is that only individuals who have been enrolled in a program are observed. Thus, we 
ignore what would happen to these individuals had they not participated to this program. 
Furthermore, the decision to participate to a post-doctoral program is certainly not random and we 
can easily assume that there are selection effects related to unobserved characteristics.  
The model used in that paper, first presented by Barnow, Cain and Goldberger (1981) is useful to 
estimate the effect of an endogenous variable, zj, on a continuous variable, yj, precisely the earnings 
three years after PhD award, conditionally to independent variables, xj :  
 j j j jy x z= b + d + e  [1] 
where zj is a binary endogenous variable indicative of post-doctoral program. 
 
Assuming that participation to a post-doctoral program is a fully random process, an estimation of 
[1] could be done with standard methods (Ols). However, stating that participation to a post-
doctoral program is a non random process and that the selection effect produces a bias when 
estimating parameters by Ols, we need to estimate a selection model in which we could obtain the 
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structural effect of post-doctoral program. By that way, the estimation strategy proposed by 
Barnow, Cain and Goldberger is fully convenient. 
The binary variable zj is modelled as the outcome of an unobservable latent variable z*j, so that:  
 *j j jz w u= g +  [2] 
where w j is a vector of exogenous variables and uj is an error term. 
 
The participation to a post-doctoral program is the outcome of the following variable :  
 
 
*
j
j *
j
1, i f z 0
z
0 , i f z 0
ì ü>ï ï= í ý
£ï ïî þ
 [3] 
 
A selection bias arises since ( )j j jE z w 0e ¹  or ( )j jE u 0e ¹ , that means the error terms of the 
principal equation and that of the selection equation are correlated (Moffit, 1995). So that we 
assume that the error terms of the equations [1] and [2] have a bivariate Normal distribution with 
mean 0 and covariance matrix úû
ù
êë
é
1r
rs . 
 
Given this assumption and with the aid of [1] and [3] we derive the wage expectation conditional to 
the participation to the post-doctoral program :  
 
 j j j j j jE y z 1 x z E z 1é ù é ù= = b+ d + e =ë û ë û  [4] 
 
From a generally point of view :  
 
 j j j j jE y z x z hé ù = b + d +lë û  [5] 
 
with the hazard hj constructed as follows :  
 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
j j j
j
jj j
ˆ ˆw w z 1
h
z 0ˆ ˆw 1 w
ì üf g F g =ï ï
= í ý
=-f g - F gï ïî þ
 [6] 
 
Finally, it is very useful to derive the estimation of wage expectations differences conditional to 
participation or not to a post-doctoral program (Greene, 2000):  
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 [7] 
 
The l parameter measures the selection effect, obtained from a two-step estimation of [5]. Another 
interpretation is that the model is augmented by a regressor hj which is the conditional expectation 
to the participation to a post-doctoral program. 
 
Given equation [5] we can see that since l = 0, the estimation of d is corrected from the selection 
bias and is no more affected by the correlation of the unobserved terms. In presence of l > 0, and 
if we do not control for the endogenous character of the post-doctoral variable, the d parameter is 
underestimated. Conversely, in the case of l < 0, the endogenous variable is overestimated, so that 
the unobserved in the both equations go in the same way. If the unobserved have a positive effect 
on participation to a post-doctoral program and if the same unobserved have a positive effect on 
getting highly paid jobs, we can intuitively conclude that the outcome of participation to a post-
doctoral program is overestimated. 
 
The treatment effect model could also be expressed in terms of human capital and signalling theory. 
In this econometric framework, the d parameter captures the human capital accumulation effect 
and the l  parameter is the outcome of non random selectivity, coming up from correlation of 
unobserved terms. It is commonly agreed that participation to post-doctoral program is related to 
particular characteristics, nevertheless, in the human capital theory these characteristics are fully 
unobserved, whereas in the signalling framework the participation to a program is partially founded 
on existing signals. In the modelling, the selectivity is broken up between human capital 
accumulation (specific or general) and productivity signalling. In the case of no selection effect and 
insignificant d, the human capital accumulated during the post-doctoral experience is not 
transferable to the firm. 
 
Most of the doctorates received a financial support for their doctoral training (4% received no 
support, see table 4 in Appendix). This pattern is very specific to graduated in exact sciences as far 
as in human and social sciences one PhD on two benefits from a funding. Actually, in exact 
sciences, private supports are more developed, based on cooperation between the French Ministry 
of Research and companies (Cifre financial support); in our sample, nearly one PhD on three 
received a grant from private funding, without real strong differences between fields of education, 
although fields like natural sciences, mechanics, engineering sciences or computer sciences find 
more easily applications in industrial research.  
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Coming to the estimation of the treatment effect model, the variables displayed in table 2 have been 
computed and introduced in the econometric modelling. Some of them are used in the wage 
equation and in the Probit estimation. In the concern of identification, some are used only for the 
wage equation and some are strictly used for the Probit equation. 
 
Below, table 2 reports estimates firstly of the wage equation without controlling for selection bias 
and secondly the treatment effect model (including the Probit estimation of going through a post-
doctoral position). 
 
Selectivity in the participation to a post-doctoral program 
Estimates coming from Probit estimation of post-doc equation reveals the existence of selectivity in 
gaining a post-doc after a Phd. It would be necessary before to come back on the different 
dimensions that are supposed to influence the probability to participate to a post-doc. As stated in 
the introduction, post-doctoral positions are theoretically considered as academic waiting time jobs 
for young doctor who are planning an academic career. This way, and as we do not know the 
professional plan of the PhDs, the financial support could be a good indicator of it. In the same 
manner, remember that academic recruitments are organised yearly and that we should expect a 
seasonal effect on the probability to participate to a post-doc program: the more the time of 
defence is far from recruitment period, the more they have chance to plan to go through a post-
doc. We also introduce a quarter dummy (SEASON) in the model to test this seasonal effect.  
After estimation, it appears that five categories of exogenous variables affect the probability of 
participation to a post-doc. They are related to field of education, financial support, age at time of 
graduation, place of doctoral training and seasonal dummies.  
 
Traditionally, doctorates in life science or in chemistry often take post-doc positions at the very 
beginning of their career, more than PhD in mathematics, mechanics, engineering sciences or 
computer sciences. The labour market of PhD gives the impression of being quite different 
depending on the field of education. Whereas doctorates in mechanics, engineering sciences or 
computer sciences are more attracted to the private sector than the public sector of research, they 
are also less attracted to post-doctoral positions after the PhD thesis. In chemistry or in natural and 
life sciences, post-doc are more heterogeneous, being post-doc supported jobs, fixed-term contracts 
in firms or in national labs (Verdier et al., 2001) so that this status has a weakened meaning in terms 
of selectivity. 
 
Table 2 – Ols estimates and treatment effect model 
685 obs. Ols Estimates  Treatment model  
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Estimates 
Ln Wage equation Coefficient Std-error Coefficient Std-error 
CONSTANT 7.612*** .0689 7.613*** .0729 
FIELD     
Mathematics  -0.069** 0.033 -0.073** 0.036 
Chemistry -0.038 0.033 -0.019 0.039 
Natural sciences -0.079** 0.038 -0.067* 0.035 
Mechanics  - - - - 
ENGINEER 0.054 0.035 0.048 0.032 
FINANCIAL SUPPORT     
private -0.022 0.036 -0.027 -0.077 
TRAINING 0.656* 0.038 0.055 0.035 
POSTDOC 0.068** 0.035 -0.074 0.134 
TIME -0.0009 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
SENIORITY 0.004* 0.002 0.004** 0.002 
SENIORITY2 -0.00002 0.00002 -0.00002 0.00002 
RESEARCHER 0.025 0.029 0.025 0.027 
SIZE     
<50 - - - - 
[50;200[ 0.037 0.040 0.039 0.037 
[200;500[ 0.076* 0.046 0.080** 0.039 
³500 0.085*** 0.032 0.089*** 0.032 
UNEMPLOYMENT -0.034* 0.017 -0.031* 0.017 
     
Postdoc equation   Treatment estimates 
(Probit estimates)  
 
CONSTANT - - 0.833 0.999 
FIELD     
Mathematics  - - -0.209 0.199 
Chemistry - - 0.506*** 0.177 
Natural sciences - - 0.352** 0.173 
Mechanics  - - - - 
ENGINEER - - -0.172 0.178 
FINANCIAL SUPPORT     
private - - -0.075 0.173 
public - - 0.321** 0.143 
no support  - - -0.130 0.369 
TIME - - -0.0002 0.0064 
AGE - - -0.073** 0.037 
MALE - - -0.179 0.126 
PLACE     
University - - - - 
Company - - -0.497** 0.219 
laboratory - - 0.320** 0.133 
SEASON     
1st quarter - - 0.166 0.170 
2nd quarter - - 0.147 0.160 
3rd quarter - - 0.389** 0.168 
4th quarter - - - - 
SELECTION PARAMETER - - 0.085 0.77 
Implementation of equation [7]  - - [7.641]-[7.635]=0.006 - 
Note : *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% levels of significance. F(15,669)=8.81 for Ols estimates. Wald-X²(21 
df)=95.6 for treatment effect model. 
The treatment effect model is estimated in full information. 
 
 
On the opposite, financial support and place of doctoral training are both signals of high selectivity 
on access to post-doctoral positions. Doctorates benefiting from public grants (financial support 
from Ministry of Research) take part more probably in a post-doc experience than those having a 
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private funding. This strengthens our assumption that post-doctoral positions are waiting time 
positions for academic jobs, so that PhDs who have not been recruited in the research public sector 
could certainly take less advantage of their post-doctoral experience. On another hand, the 
probability to go through a post-doc when doctoral training took place in a company is lower, 
whereas the is no significant effect of the private funding on the probability to go through. 
 
Place and time are both exogenous dimensions that change the probability of participation. 
Depending on the time of graduation, enrolment in post-doc position is slightly higher. We can 
notice that distribution of defences is strongly seasonal: defences are more frequent at the end of 
the year civil (third and forth quarter) due to the organisation of academic recruitments. Estimates 
produce a significant seasonal effect which displays a diary effect. Those who defend their PhD 
thesis early (3rd quarter) comparatively to the usual period of defence (4th quarter) are more likely 
designed for waiting time positions, in this case post-doctoral positions.  
 
Male and female have the same probability to participate to a post-doc program, whereas age is a 
decreasing factor for the participation. We can easily assume that as post-doc often take place 
abroad, mobility is discouraged for a period of time quite long (usually one year long or more); this 
result was already put in evidence by Cahuzac and Robin (2003). 
Unexpectedly, time to graduation seems to have no effect on the probability to take a post-doc job. 
Nevertheless, time to graduation could be seen as a potential signal of quality (shorter thesis are 
assumed to be better) or a human capital effect when doctorates apply for a post-doc supposed to 
be selective. Following the knowledge theories, during their PhD, doctorates produce knowledge 
and circulates it (Mangematin and Robin, 2003). Doctorates produce knowledge in the form of 
scientific papers, industrial cooperation, contribution to patents and circulate it mainly after they 
have been awarded their doctorate. Also, the more the time to graduation is long, the more the time 
of production is extended too and the effect of TIME variable should be significant. This is simply 
due to the fact that AGE partially capture this quality effect. The younger, that is those whom time 
to graduation is shorter, are more probably selected for post-doc participation.  
 
As we seen in this section, several elements invite us to conclude that participation to post-doctoral 
programs are highly selective. We then expect that the outcome of participation to a post-doc 
would be overestimated if selection effect is not controlled for. This is the main finding of the next 
section. 
 
A spurious positive effect of post-doctoral program on wages 
The coefficient of the participation to post-doctoral program is no more significant on earnings in 
private jobs as soon as we control for the endogenous status of post-doc variable. However, 
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without controlling for selection bias of post-doc variable, OLS estimates yield a positive wage 
return gained from this experience.  
 
We could conclude that there is no wage premium gained from this experience. Moreover, the 
estimate of selection parameter is positively signed, although not significant. An implementation of 
[7]  yields the net wage premium potentially gained for young people having participated to post-
doctoral program and reveals that the wage differential expectation is close to zero (0.006). This 
main result suggests that, conditionally to regressors included, there is no direct effect of 
participation to post-doctorate program. In that way, it does not produce transferable human 
capital but creates either positive signal, differentiating doctorates. 
 
Two of the variables that could explain the internal differentiation lie on time to degree (TIME) 
and financial support (FINANCIAL SUPPORT), as time to degree could represent a factor of 
human capital and financial support acts for a signal. Neither of these two key variables are 
statistically significant, almost certainly already included by POSTDOC effect (that means indirectly 
by the selection equation). 
 
Signals yielded by unemployment are also noticeably actives: each unemployment period induces a 
relative wage loss from approximately 3%. Although few PhDs are frequently unemployed, these 
young people highly qualified undergo the negative effect of unemployment, since at the same time 
they have difficulties to get value from their post-doctoral experience, in the sense that the 
POSTDOC coefficient is insignificant.  
 
At last, young PhDs who have been recruited as researcher in the private sector do not take 
advantage from wages higher when they went through post-doctoral program, whereas, at the same 
time, return from seniority is slightly significant. Whereas the knowledge theory paves the way for a 
valuable doctorate in the R&D sector, being able to solve complex problems, to define problem, to 
play the role of a gatekeeper, allowing for knowledge translation and absorption, force is to note 
that this model of knowledge do not fit with wage returns. 
This is corroborated by the insignificant ENGINEER coefficient, while co-construction of 
competencies would be expected to be valued on the private part of the labour market4. This is 
finally also not surprising that wages expectation are lower in small productive units, as a part of 
R&D activity is externalised more and more frequently. 
                                                 
4 This result have been also noticed on a recent study using another longitudinal database on early-stage 
career of doctorates. 
Giret J.F., Perret C., Recotillet I. (2003) “Les jeunes scientifiques dans le secteur privé: quel rendement 
de la formation doctorale” in “Mondialisation et régulation sociale”, Tome 2, L’Harmattan eds., pp.841-
854. 
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As post-doctoral program and jobs as researchers in the R&D activity sector do not provide 
significant premium wage, we could presume that these scientists “pay” to be scientists, as Stern 
underlined in a recent paper (Stern, 1999), in an increased way for doctorates graduated in 
mathematics or natural sciences, compared to those graduates in mechanics or engineering sciences. 
 
 
4. A sample selection model based on a Bivariate selection rule 
 
From the beginning of the paper, we sustained that post-doctoral programs are mainly designated 
to academic research careers. As data on doctorates destination indicate, a unimportant part of 
them turns to private job after their post-doctorate job. In the model estimated in the previous 
section, we did not take into account the possible selection bias that occurs when including only 
doctorates in private job at time of the survey. We may nevertheless suspect that some unobserved 
terms are common in the determination of post-doctoral participation and job destination (public 
or private). The model proposed in this section attempts to control for this selection bias using a 
bivariate selection rule. 
 
Equation [1] becomes : 
 = b + ej j jy x  [8] 
 
to which we add the bivariate latent processus: 
 
 
*
*
'
'
priv priv priv priv
post post post post
z x u
z x u
b
b
= +
= +
 [9] 
with jz if z= >1 0,0otherwiseforj=priv,post  
 
To account for selection bias, we assume that , ,priv postu ue  are correlated. This implies that the 
errors terms of [8] and [9] are distributed following a trivariate normal distribution whom one only 
knows the variance (s², 1, 1). Inverse mills ratio from bivariate probit estimation are hold from a 
first step estimation and are then included in the wage equation.  The corrected sample selection 
model is by the way: 
 
1 1 2 21, 1priv postE y z z x a ab l lé ù= = = + +ë û  [10] 
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The corrective terms; namely l1 and l2  are determined as follows: 
 
 
2
1
2
( ' ) ( ' ) / (1 )priv priv post post postx x xf b b r r
l
é ù- F - - -ê úë û=
F
 
 
 
2
2
1
( ' ) ( ' ) / (1 )post post priv priv privx x xf b b r r
l
é ù- F - - -ê úë û=
F
 
with f  the density and F  the  cumulative of a normal distribution and r the estimated correlation 
parameter from [9] 
 
The model is implemented on the full sample of doctorates employed in a private firm or in the 
public sector at time of the survey. Estimations are reported in table 3 (below) and descriptive 
statistics of the variables can be found in table 5 (Appendix). The sample size is then 1,264 
individuals for which we give details in the table 3 (685 are in the private sector in march 1999 and 
284 participated to a post-doctoral program). The same regressors as in the previous section are 
included in the post-doc equation. In the second equation, that explaining the fact that doctorates 
have been recruited in the private sector  information on thesis has been introduced: field of 
education, type of financial support, training in a firm and time to graduation. The underlying 
assumption is that the more links are established within firms during the thesis, the more doctorates 
are attracted to the private sector (Beltramo et al., 2001).We also include a regional information on 
density of researchers in the private sphere, expecting that in labour markets with a high density of 
researchers in firms, attraction to the private sector is greater. 
 
 A selection effect based on public/private  job type 
What we observe first from the bivariate selection rule is a negative correlation between the two 
equations ‘being in the private sector” and “going through a post-doctoral job”, meaning that 
unobservable terms from the private job equation are negatively link to those of the post-doctoral 
job equation.  As far as unobservable that have a positive effect on recruitment in the private sector 
have a negative impact on participation to a post-doctoral program, we might infer that selection 
criteria are based on different element on one hand in the private sector and on the other hand in 
the participation to a program. This finding strengthen the hypothesis that post-doctoral program is 
more related to public career whom selection rules are rather different, as academic rules 
(publications for instance) are often opposed to private criteria. 
 
Table 3 – Ols Estimates and bivariate selection rule 
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1264 obs. Ols Estimates  Selection model  
Ln Wage equation Coefficient Std-error Coefficient Std-error 
CONSTANT 7.4251*** 0.0328 7.6259*** 0.4199 
MALE 0.1245*** 0.0187 0.1535** 0.0670 
FIELD     
Mathematics  -0.0127 0.0242 -0.1820 0.1326 
Chemistry -0.0175 0.0251 0.0096 0.1393 
Natural sciences -0.0422* 0.0233 -0.0779 0.1327 
Mechanics  - - - - 
ENGINEER 0.0606*** 0.0235 -0.0279 0.1087 
FINANCIAL SUPPORT     
Private 0.0021 0.0233 0.0393 0.2019 
Public -0.0624*** 0.0204 -0.2078** 0.0917 
No support - - - - 
POSTDOC -0.0006 0.0207 - - 
TIME GE 4 -0.0136 0.0209 0.1358* 0.0811 
SENIORITY 0.0025*** 0.0005 0.0008 0.0041 
RESEARCHER 0.0007 0.0253 -0.0416 0.1588 
SIZE     
<50 - - - - 
[50;200[ 0.0122 0.0278 0.01630 0.1066 
[200;500[ 0.0453* 0.0248 0.0178 0.1156 
³500 0.0966*** 0.0203 0.0467 0.0835 
PRIVATE SECTOR 0.1286*** 0.0255 - - 
Selection parameters     
l1 - - 0.3064 0.3902 
l2 - - -0.1727 0.1841 
Bivariate selection rule     
Postdoc equation     
FIELD     
Mathematics  - - 0.2756** 0.1314 
Chemistry - - 0.6722*** 0.1372 
Natural sciences - - 0.4980*** 0.1204 
Mechanics  - - - - 
ENGINEER - - -0.0386 0.1226 
FINANCIAL SUPPORT     
private - - -0.2007 0.1403 
public - - 0.2628*** 0.0965 
no support  - - -0.5362* 0.2954 
other - - - - 
TIME - - -0.0033 0.0046 
AGE - - -0.0693*** 0.0252 
MALE - - 0.0940 0.0899 
PLACE     
University - - - - 
Company - - -0.3873** 0.1814 
laboratory - - 0.1465 0.0928 
SEASON     
1st quarter - - 0.2252* 0.1169 
2nd quarter - - 0.2597** 0.1104 
3rd quarter - - 0.3398*** 0.1181 
4th quarter - - - - 
Private equation     
MALE - - -0.0464 0.0796 
FIELD     
Mathematics  - - -0.1700 0.1098 
Chemistry - - 0.2794** 0.1177 
Natural sciences - - -0.2142** 0.1038 
Mechanics  - - - - 
ENGINEER - - -0.1314 0.1020 
FINANCIAL SUPPORT     
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Private - - 0.6696*** 0.1276 
Public - - -0.0881 0.0860 
No support - - -0.0772 0.1892- 
Other - - - - 
TRAINING - - 0.3804*** 0.1064 
TIME - - 0.0035 0.0035 
DENSITYRD - - -0.0012 0.0034 
Correlation parameter - - -0.1342** 0.0524 
Note : *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% levels of significance. F(14,1249)=15.66 for Ols estimates. X²(df=15)=40.07 for 
the selection model. 
 
It partially appears in the FINANCIAL SUPPORT variable. Those who benefited from a private 
support are more probably attracted to the private sector while there is no effect in the participation 
equation. Also doctorates who where trained in a firm during their PhD have more chances to hold 
a job in the private sector. These elements support the hypothesis according to which intensity of 
relationship with firms is a strong factor explaining trajectories of doctorates. In addition, we 
remark that those who benefited from a public support attend more often a post-doctoral program, 
and that the effect in the other equation is insignificant.  
 
It is important to notice that whether it concerns participation to a post-doctoral program or 
attraction to the private sector, the FIELD dummies have always a significant effect. Mainly, 
doctorates graduated in nature and life sciences are attracted to a public career, as far as estimated 
coefficient is negative in the first equation and positive in the participation to post-doctoral 
program. On the other hand, disciplines as mathematics or chemistry  have different connections 
with participation and private trajectory: doctorates of the both disciplines more often go through 
post-doctoral positions and turn to the private sector afterwards. In the chemistry sector for 
instance, firms often use post-doctoral positions as temporary jobs (Lanciano and Nohara, 2002), 
deviating of post-doctoral program as a first step for an academic career.  
 
 A still insignificant effect of post-doctoral participation on wage 
In the estimation of the wage equation when controlling for bivariate selection, the two parameters 
l1 and l2 measuring  the selection effect become insignificantly different from zero, whereas the 
dummy variable PRIVE depart significantly from zero (in a positive way) in the uncorrected wage 
equation (Table 5). Finally, the POSTDOC variable are no more effect on wage: those who 
participated to a post-doctoral training do not benefit from their experience, when we controlled 
for unobservable explaining at the same time participation to a program and recruitment in the 
private sector. This model confirms our first finding in which POSTDOC did not significantly 
improved wage of participant. 
 
However, time to graduation play a significant role on the wage earned, as far as time to graduation 
is greater than the average, that means, more than four years. Human capital accumulated during 
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the thesis is then valued on the private sphere while post-doctoral participation does not, so that we 
could conclude that post-doctoral position yields an anti-screening device compared to the effect of 
PhD experience itself. This is reinforced indirectly by FINANCIAL SUPPORT effect: doctorates 
having had financial support from Ministry of Research  -supposed to pursue an academic career 
and participating more often to post-doctoral programs- have wages lower than those having had 
other financial supports. Note also that a private support has no effect on wages, giving a larger 
weight to the negative effect of the aforementioned public support. 
 
The variable indicating discipline of PhD dissertation (FIELD) are no more significant in the wage 
equation. Field of education play a huge effect in the determination of career choice 
(public/private) and also on the participation to post-doctoral program, nevertheless, when 
controlled for the selection effect of these two variables, academic discipline has no more effect, so 
that wage returns are similar across doctorates in the different fields of education.  
 
These findings point out that the way the thesis is carried out have a strong impact at the same time 
on the participation to a post-doctoral position and to the position on the labour market in terms 
of sector, public or private, but that these effects disappear on wages as far as they are controlled 
for in the selection  model.  
 
Two factors remain durably significant on wages: TIME and FINANCIAL SUPPORT as we 
underlined before. Concerning variables related to job description, size of the company and 
seniority become insignificant as the bivariate selection rule is implemented – we compare here with 
the simple OLS model -. A robust finding is emerging in the estimation: jobs of researchers – 
RESEARCHER – have comparable wage levels as other functions in firms or public institutions. 
We emphasize again a result of the section 3 according to which there is no wage premium for 
doctorates  working as researchers. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we attempt to highlight a rather dark part of literature on doctorates first-stage 
careers concerning post-doctorates effect on job hold afterwards. In particular, this paper focus on 
post-doctorates who did not attend the public sector as it is however traditionally expected. More 
than a quarter of doctorates get through a post-doc and around 20% of them were attracted to the 
private sector afterwards. Using longitudinal data carried out by the French Ministry of Education 
on higher education graduates (graduated in 1996 and surveyed  in 1999), we estimated first a 
treatment effect model in which the endogenous variable is participation to a post-doctoral 
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program. Willing to control for the possible effect of type of orientation (public versus private) we 
estimated then a wage equation with bivariate selection rule. 
 
The main finding of the treatment effect model is that when controlling for the endogenous nature 
of post-doctoral participation, the positive effect on wages disappear, leading to a insignificant 
effect of post-doctoral participation. This finding is largely consolidated with the bivariate selection 
rule. On one hand we observe a negative correlation of the unobservable between post-doctorate 
participation and private sector orientation,  and on the other hand selection parameter relative to 
post-doctorate participation is insignificant. We might conclude that doctorates with post-doctorate 
experience do not find wage premium of their experience, invalidating in that way the traditional 
economic relation between education, experience and wage. In the model of labour market 
circulation we sketched, the transition from post-doctorate to private sector is then not valued. At a 
time when national research policies tend to improve fixed-term contracts on one hand and 
investment in private research on the other hand, our findings should minor the possible effect of 
such policies and should lead to improvements of doctoral training in order to better suits 
doctorates to the private sector. A promising direction could be international comparison, especially 
with the US labour market for doctorates, in which there are traditionally more exchanges between 
the academic and the private sphere. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 4 –Regressors used in the treatment effect model, description and statistics 
Name Description Mean (std-
error) 
WAGE Wage earned in 1999 (€) 2250 (2260) 
MALE 1 if male 0.61 (0.48) 
POSTDOC 1 if participation to a post doctoral program 0.18 (0.39) 
FIELD 1 if PhD in mathematics 0.20 (0.40) 
 1 if PhD in mechanics engineering sciences 0.29 (0.45) 
 1 if chemistry 0.22 (0.41) 
 1 if natural sciences 0.29 (0.46) 
ENGINEER 1 if graduated from an engineering school before 0.19 (0.39) 
FINANCIAL SUPPORT 1 if private financial support for doctoral training 0.28 (0.44) 
 1 if public financial support for doctoral training 0.34 (0.47) 
 1 if other sources of financial support (job…) 0.34 (0.47) 
 1 if no financial support 0.04 (0.19) 
TRAINING 1 if training in a company during doctoral training 0.37 (0.48) 
TIME Time to doctorate graduation (in months) 42.93 (10.4) 
SEASON 1 if graduation during the 1st quarter of 1996 0.19 (0.38) 
 1 if graduation during the 2nd quarter of 1996 0.24 (0.41) 
 1 if graduation during the 3rd  quarter of 1996 0.17 (0.37) 
 1 if graduation during the 4th quarter of 1996 0.40 (0.48) 
AGE Age at time of graduation (in 1996) 28.6 (1.9) 
PLACE 1 if doctoral training in a university 0.49 (0.50) 
 1 if doctoral training in a firm 0.20 (0.40) 
 1 if doctoral training in a lab 0.28 (0.45) 
RESEARCHER 1 if industrial researcher for the job held in 1999 0.03 (0.17) 
SIZE 1 if size of the company < 50 0.21 (0.40) 
 1 if size of the company between 50 and 200 0.14 (0.35) 
 1 if size of the company between 200 and 500 0.14 (0.35) 
 1 if size of the company ³ 500 0.31 (0.46) 
 1 if size missing 0.20 (0.41) 
UNEMPLOYMENT Number of unemployment spells between 
graduation and job held in 1999 
0.69 (0.80) 
SENIORITY Number of months employed in a company for the 
job held in 1999 
22.6 (16.3) 
SENIORITY2 SENIORITY squared 778 (1534) 
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Table 5 - Regressors used in the sample selection model with bivariate selection rule, 
description and statistics 
Name Description Full sample  
(obs=1264) 
Private sector 
(obs=685) 
Participation 
to a program 
(obs=284) 
  Mean (std-
error) 
Mean (std-
error) 
Mean (std-
error) 
WAGE Wage earned in 1999 (€) 2126.2 (1959) 2250 (2260) 2042.19 
(2188.54) 
MALE 1 if male 0.61 (0.49) 0.61 (0.48) 0.58 (0.49) 
POSTDOC 1 if participation to a post doctoral 
program 
0.22 (0.42) 0.18 (0.39) 1 
FIELD 1 if PhD in mathematics 0.22 (0.42) 0.20 (0.40) 0.23 (0.42) 
 1 if PhD in mechanics engineering 
sciences 
0.26 (0.44) 0.29 (0.45) 0.14 (0.35) 
 1 if chemistry 0.18 (0.38) 0.22 (0.41) 0.25 (0.43) 
 1 if natural sciences 0.34 (0.47) 0.29 (0.46) 0.38 (0.49) 
ENGINEER 1 if graduated from an engineering school 
before 
0.18 (0.38) 0.19 (0.39) 0.15 (0.39) 
FINANCIAL SUPPORT 1 if private financial support for doctoral 
training 
0.19 (0.39) 0.28 (0.44) 0.11 (0.31) 
 1 if public financial support for doctoral 
training 
0.41 (0.49) 0.34 (0.47) 0.55 (0.49) 
 1 if other sources of financial support 
(job…) 
0.36 (0.48) 0.34 (0.47) 0.34 (0.48) 
 1 if no financial support 0.04 (0.20) 0.04 (0.19) 0.01 (0.12) 
TRAINING 1 if training in a company during doctoral 
training 
0.27 (0.44) 0.37 (0.48) 0.12 (0.33) 
TIME Time to doctorate graduation (in months) 42.78 (10.87) 42.93 (10.4) 41.67 (9.07) 
TIME4 Time to doctorate graduation over 4 
years 
0.23 (0.42) 0.24 (0.43) 0.22 (0.42) 
SEASON 1 if graduation during the 1st quarter of 
1996 
0.19 (0.39) 0.19 (0.38) 0.20 (0.40) 
 1 if graduation during the 2nd quarter of 
1996 
0.22 (0.41) 0.24 (0.41) 0.24 (0.43) 
 1 if graduation during the 3rd  quarter of 
1996 
0.15 (0.36) 0.17 (0.37) 0.20 (0.39) 
 1 if graduation during the 4th quarter of 
1996 
0.40 (0.49) 0.40 (0.48) 0.36 (0.48) 
AGE Age at time of graduation (in 1996) 28.6 (2.0) 28.6 (1.9) 28.18 (1.75) 
PLACE 1 if doctoral training in a university 0.52 (0.49) 0.49 (0.50) 0.58 (0.49) 
 1 if doctoral training in a firm 0.12 (0.32) 0.20 (0.40) 0.04 (0.19) 
 1 if doctoral training in a lab 0.32 (0.46) 0.28 (0.45) 0.38 (0.48) 
RESEARCHER 1 if researcher for the job held in 1999 0.42 (0.49) 0.03 (0.17) 0.55 (0.49) 
SIZE 1 if size of the company < 50 0.16 (0.36) 0.21 (0.40) 0.14 (0.35) 
 1 if size of the company between 50 and 
200 
0.16 (0.37) 0.14 (0.35) 0.16 (0.37) 
 1 if size of the company between 200 and 
500 
0.14 (0.35) 0.14 (0.35) 0.13 (0.39) 
 1 if size of the company ³ 500 0.35 (0.48) 0.31 (0.46) 0.35 (0.48) 
 1 if size missing 0.17 (0.38) 0.20 (0.41) 0.22 (0.41) 
SENIORITY Number of months employed in a 
company for the job held in 1999 
21.92 (19.07) 22.6 (16.3) 12.53 (9.3) 
DENSITYRD Density of private researchers for 10,000 
habitants by region 
17.21 (10.68) 17.11 (10.18) 17.57 (11.52) 
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